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As interactions between individuals are introduced into the freedom of choice
literature by the mean of game forms, new issues appear. In particular, in this
paper it is argued that individuals face uncertainty with respect to outcomes
as they lose the control they implicitely exert over options in the opportunity
set framework. A criterion is proposed as to compare alternative game forms in
terms of the control they oﬀer to individuals. The CardMin criterion suggests
that any game form should be judged on the basis of the strategy oﬀering the
lowest number of pairwise diﬀerent outcomes. An axiomatic characterization is
provided in the case of two individuals.
1 Introduction
In this paper what is under scrutiny is the problem of measuring the control that
individuals exert over the diﬀerent outcomes they are facing in game forms, as part of
the total freedom of choice they enjoy. Freedom of choice has been the subject of a large
and stimulating debate and has appeared since ﬁfteen years to be a central concern to
social choice theorists who believe that economic policies should no longer be judged in
terms of the consequences they have on individuals’ well being only, as they are in the
traditional welfarist approach.
Rather, the amount of freedom of choice available to the individuals should also be
of importance in the evaluation of the policies (see e.g. Rawls (1971), Sen (1985, 1988,
1991) for more detailed discussions). In a concern for formalising the concept of freedom
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1of choice, the literature considers that individuals are facing opportunity sets, deﬁned
as the sets of all options available to them (see e.g. Arrow (1995), Barbera, Bossert
and Pattanaik (2005), Foster (2005), Gravel, Laslier and Trannoy (1998), Pattanaik
and Xu (1990), Puppe (1996), Sugden (1998), Suppes (1996), Van Hees (1997) for
representative contributions and surveys).
In Bervoets (2007), it has been pointed out that the traditional literature on free-
dom suﬀers from its neglect of the interactions that take place between agents forming
the society. Indeed, the usual framework assumes that individuals face opportunity
sets from which they can choose any option, regardless of any interactive constraints.
Individuals are considered alone and this is rather problematic for an attempt to de-
ﬁne freedom of choice, especially when one has in mind the famous maxim according
to which “the freedom of one begins where the freedom of others ends”. In order to
account for the interactions, Bervoets (2007) considered game forms rather than op-
portunity sets as the proper object to appraise individual freedom of choice. In game
forms, as opposed to opportunity sets, individuals are not able to determine the ﬁnal
outcome of the social situation by their own choice. Rather, each individual can choose
a strategy which, along with the choice of others, will determine the social outcome.
In the interactive framework, options (i.e. strategies1) and outcomes diﬀer, contrary to
the traditional framework of opportunity sets in which both coincide. In the present
paper the game form framework is adopted.
The appraisal of freedom of choice in a social context raises some subtle issues, one
of which being the uncertainty about the ﬁnal outcome to which a particular individual
decision may lead. Uncertainty and control are regarded as two opposite issues herein,
as less control for individuals over outcomes of the game form implies more uncertainty
and vice-versa. Eventhough one agrees with the views defended throughout the freedom
of choice literature that freedom should be measured on the basis of the quantity and
the quality of choices available, it seems clear that the availability of a large number
of possible outcomes that have very low probability of occurrence does not contribute
much to the freedom enjoyed by the individual. Hence, among other important features,
the control exerted by individuals over outcomes should be one issue raised when trying
to evaluate freedom of choice.
Uncertainty has been the subject of large attention in decision theory, where it is
assumed either in a “partial” form - individuals are assumed to know the probabilities
of occurrence of the diﬀerent outcomes2 (see e.g. Kreps (1988) or Machina (1987) for
accessible surveys) - or in a complete form - individuals know the set of outcomes
associated to every option but have no information about probabilities or likelihood
ranking for these outcomes (see e.g. Bossert (1997), Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (2000),
Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984), Pattanaik and Peleg (1984) for representative pieces).
The present contribution is in line with this second stream of literature because complete
1Throughout the terms strategy and option will be used indiﬀerently.
2According to the distinction suggested by Knight (1921), this litterature refers to risk rather than
uncertainty.
2uncertainty is assumed but it diﬀers because game forms are compared instead of sets.
Another diﬀerence between this and the traditional approach on uncertainty is that
individuals are not equipped with preferences. This is because the concern of this paper
is about a pure notion of control. What is under scrutiny is the meaning of “individual
i has total (or high, low, partial ...) control over outcomes”, independently from the
preferences this individual has 3. One may argue that it is valuable for players to have
a high level of control over outcomes they desire and it is also valuable to have control
over outcomes they highly dislike, as to prevent those outcomes to be realised. This
cannot be done without introducing preferences. As one can see, it is conceivable to
connect the notion of control with that of preferences, but such a connection is not
provided in this paper. Rather, what is regarded is a notion of predictability of the
outcomes by individuals.
Another literature worth mentioning followed Sen’s Liberal Paretian Paradox (Sen
(1970)) concerning individual rights. After three decades of intensive debate on this
issue, a disputed (see e.g. Sen (1983)) majority seems to have reached a consensus
that rights should be modelled using game forms rather than the traditional social
choice framework (see e.g. Deb (1994,2004), Deb, Pattanaik and Razzolini (1997),
Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1992), G¨ ardenfors (1981), Peleg (1984, 1998)).
Within the game form framework, eﬀectivity functions have been under scrutiny as
functions assigning rights to individuals or to coalitions, giving them the power of
restricting the possible outcomes of the game form into a special subset (see e.g. Deb
(1994), Moulin (1983), Peleg (1984, 1998) on that particular issue). Eﬀectivity functions
and control are related as the more eﬀective an individual, the more control he exerts
over outcomes. However, this literature is mainly devoted to the analysis of diﬀerent
notions of eﬀectivity and their inﬂuence on the modelling of rights, and it has not
produced yet, to the best of my knowledge, methods for comparing alternative game
forms on the basis of the “eﬀectivity” individuals enjoy.
Focusing on the case of two individuals forming the society, an axiomatic charac-
terisation is obtained of a criterion called the CardMin, that compares two game forms
in terms of the control they oﬀer. A CardMin strategy for player i is a strategy leading
for individual i to the lowest number of pairwise diﬀerent outcomes in the game form.
The CardMin criterion then compares two game forms on the basis of the number of
outcomes associated to the CardMin strategy in each game form. While this method
for comparing game forms may seem naive, among other reasons because it does not
consider the justiﬁcations for which individuals may value control, it has the merit of
being, as far as I am aware of, a ﬁrst attempt to introduce that issue into the freedom
of choice literature in the game form framework.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section will be introduced
the formal framework, section 3 then presents the axioms used in the characterisation
3This relates to the way in which Pattanaik and Xu (1990) measure a pure notion of freedom of
choice
3result given in section 4. Independance of the axioms is shown in the same section, and
reasons why the extension to n individuals reveals problematic are discussed through
an example. Section 5 concludes.
2 Notations
Let N = {1,2} be the set of players. A game form is deﬁned with the following elements
(besides the set of individuals):
- Ai a set of all conceivable strategies individual i can face. Subsets of Ai will be denoted
by Ai,Bi... and the cartesian product A1 × A2 will be denoted as A.
- X a set of all social outcomes generated by the strategies in A1 and A2.
- An outcome function g : A1 × A2 −→ X. This function associates a unique social
outcome to any combination of individual strategies. An outcome is thus given by
g(a1,a2) = x where a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2 and x ∈ X.
A game form is given by the pair (A,g). Let G be the set of all game forms and let
G(g) ⊂ G be the set of all game forms generated by the outcome function g. The analysis
will be led throughout this paper with G(g) rather than G, but this restriction of domain
is made for notational convenience only. Considering any game forms in G would yield
unnecessary notational complexity in what follows; however the characterisation result
of section 4 would still hold without this restriction, given some slight changes in the
axioms used. Hence, and so long as there is no ambiguity, game forms in G(g) are
designated uniquely by the set A, droping the outcome function g from the notation.
Let i be deﬁned for all i ∈ N as a transitive binary relation over G(g). For all
A,B ∈ G(g), A i B means that “the control over outcomes oﬀered by the game form
A is at least as great for individual i as the control over outcomes oﬀered by game form
B”. i and ∼i are the antisymmetric and symmetric parts of i. The cardinality of
any set D will be denoted #D.
From now on the analysis will be made from individual 1’s standpoint (i = 1). This
is of course without any loss of generality.
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy a2 ∈ A2 is ({a1} × A2)-neutral for individual 1 if ∃s0
2 ∈ A2,
a2 6= s0
2, such that g(a1,a2) = g(a1,s0
2)
This deﬁnition says that a strategy available to individual 2 is neutral for individual 1,
with respect to strategy a1, if the outcome generated by that neutral strategy could be
generated using another strategy in A2.
Remark 1 If a2 ∈ A2 is ({a1} × {s0
2})-neutral for individual 1 then of course s0
2 is
({a1} × {a2})-neutral for individual 1
43 Axioms
Some axioms about the way speciﬁc sets should be compared in terms of control are
discussed in this section.
Axiom 1 ∀a1,b1 ∈ A1,∀a2,b2 ∈ A2, {a1} × {a2} ∼1 {b1} × {b2}
This axiom simply says that all game forms consisting of one strategy only should be
considered indiﬀerent in terms of control. In other words, in these game forms player 1
has trivially full control over the unique possible outcome so a very natural requirement
is that both games oﬀer the same control. If control was to be apprehended in a larger
framework considering individual preferences, axiom 1 should take them into account
in some way. In its form, this axiom suggests that what is under scrutiny is a “pure”
notion of control.
Axiom 2 If a2 ∈ A2 is not ({a1} × {s0
2})-neutral for individual 1 then
{a1} × {s
0
2} 1 {a1} × {a2,s
0
2}
This axiom is inspired by the second axiom used in Pattanaik and Xu (1990), although
it is used reversely, stating that any set with two elements oﬀers strictly less control
than the singletons it contains. It is again very natural that individual 1 should strictly
have a better evaluation of control over one unique possible outcome than over a set
of two possible outcomes, including that of the ﬁrst game form. Indeed, in the second
game form, the choice of the ﬁnal outcome fully relies on the other player’s decision,
hence there is a “total” uncertainty about the ﬁnal outcome whereas there is none in
the ﬁrst game form. The predictability of the outcome is much higher in the ﬁrst case
than in the second, justifying the ranking suggested by axiom 2.
Axiom 3 If a2 ∈ A2 is ({a1} × A2)-neutral then {a1} × A2 ∼1 {a1} × A2 ∪ {a2}.
Whenever individual 1’s set is a singleton, adding a new strategy to individual 2 that
generates no new outcome, leaves individual 1 indiﬀerent. This axiom, although seem-
ingly natural and intuitive, is an important conceptual one. Indeed, options in game
forms can be described on the basis of the vectors of contingent outcomes that they
generate. Alternatively options can be described on the basis of the sets of possible
outcomes. This second approach leads to some loss of information as what only mat-
ters is whether outcomes exist as the result of at least one combination of options,
independently of how many times they appear in the game form. However in terms of
control this loss of information should not inﬂuence our judgment as no probabilities
are attached to outcomes. Hence the fact that one outcome appears more frequently
in the game form than another does not tell us that it will appear more frequently
than the other once the game is played. If one could easily admit that the generation
5of a new outcome by addition of a strategy to individual 2’s set would strictly reduce
individual 1’s control over the ﬁnal outcome and therefore that the set {x,y,z} would
oﬀer less control than the set {x,y}, it seems natural to state that both vectors (x,y)
and (x,y,y), yielding each of them the same set {x,y}, oﬀer the same amount of control
to individual 1. Axiom 3 says that the information lost with the choice of the set-based
model does not intervene in the ranking of sets. (For a more detailed discussion about
set-based or vector-based models, see Pattanaik and Peleg (1984)).
Axiom 4 If a2 ∈ A2 is not ({a1}×A2)-neutral and b2 ∈ A2 is not ({b1}×B2)-neutral
for individual 1 then
{a1} × A2 1 {b1} × B2 ⇐⇒ {a1} × A2 ∪ {a2} 1 {b1} × B2 ∪ {b2}
This axiom concerns only game forms for which individual 1 has a singleton as a strategy
set. In those cases it is required that adding (or removing) exactly one possible outcome
to two diﬀerent game forms cannot reverse the ranking that preexisted. Notice that
the strategies added on both sides are not necessarily the same, making this axiom a
strong one. However, note once again that it is valid only when individual 1 is facing a
singleton, keeping silent on the cases where individual 1 has a larger set of strategies.
This implies that the addition of one option to individual 2’s set of options generates
only one additional outcome to the considered game form. As axiom 1 states that both
options added are judged to be indiﬀerent one with the other, axiom 4 associated to
axiom 1 states that the addition of indiﬀerent outcomes on both sides cannot reverse
the ranking.
Axiom 5 If A1 × A2 1 B1 × A2 then A1 × A2 ∼1 A1 ∪ B1 × A2
Note that this axiom, contrary to the four previous ones, considers what happens for
some changes aﬀecting individual 1’s set of strategies, assuming individual 2’s set is
ﬁxed.
To make interpretation clearer, axiom 5 should be divided in two parts. On the
one side, adding a set of strategies oﬀering less control than the available strategies do,
cannot increase the overall control in the game form. This is a very common requirement
in social choice theory (known as the Gardenf¨ ors principle), stating that adding to a
set an element that is worse than the elements of the set cannot increase its overall
appraisal.
On the other hand, oﬀering more strategies to an individual, whether better or worse,
cannot decrease his evaluation of the control she enjoys over the outcomes. Actually,
if the individual is not interested in the new strategies, she is free not to choose them,
making it diﬃcult to accept that she could be penalised by the addition of strategies.
Her situation is thus not worse. If it is required that the addition does not strictly
reduce the overall control nor does it strictly increase it, then the overall control in
both game forms is equivalent.
6Eventhough this axiom seems not unreasonnable, it fails to be satisfactory in the
case in which individual 2’s set of strategy is a singleton. In that special case, individual
1 has total control over every outcome of the game form as he decides on his own which
one will come out. There is no uncertainty. It is then more valuable to have a full
choice over a larger set of outcomes, nevertheless axiom 5 says that whatever the size of
individual 1’s set the control is the same. This is due to the fact that what is measured
here is the predicability of the outcome rather than the freedom of choice the individual
enjoys. Predictability is full for individual 1 whether he can choose from a singleton or
from a huge set.
4 Characterization result
As to illustrate the deﬁnitions that follow, consider the game form where A1 = {s,t,u}
and A2 = {a,b,c,d} :
(Aex,g) =
a b c d
s x y z z
t y w x z
u x y x x
Deﬁnition 2 Let D(ai,A) = {g(ai,a2);∀a2 ∈ A2}
D(ai,A) is the set of outcomes associated to strategy ai played by individual 1. Cardi-
nality of D(ai,A) may be smaller than that of A2. For instance, D(t,Aex) = {y,w,x,z}
and D(u,Aex) = {x,y}.
Deﬁnition 3 Let Z(A) = {D(ai,A);∀ai ∈ A1}.
Hence, Z(Aex) = {{x,y,z},{y,w,x,z},{x,y}}. To draw a parallel with the framework
in which no interactions are taken into account, the set Z(A) could be viewed as the
opportunity set of individual 1. Indeed, individual 1 can choose freely any of the sets
D(ai,A) ∈ Z(A), like she would choose any option in her opportunity set. Still, the
main diﬀerence between both frameworks is that options are a complete description of
the world whereas here they are not. They are sets of uncertain prospects.
Deﬁnition 4 Let a CardMin strategy for individual 1 be deﬁned as a∗ ∈ A1 such that
#D(a∗,A) ≤ #D(ai,A) ∀D(ai,A) ∈ Z(A). Furthermore, CM(A) = #D(a∗,A).
The CardMin strategy is not deﬁned uniquely, it is one of individual 1’s strategies that
generates the least possible outcomes in the game. For instance, in Aex, #D(s,A) = 3,
#D(t,A) = 4 and #D(u,A) = 2. Therefore u ∈ A1 is a CardMin strategy, it is the
only one and CM(Aex) = 2.
Let us ﬁnally deﬁne the CardMin criterion, CM
1 .
7Deﬁnition 5 CM
1 is a transitive binary relation comparing game forms deﬁned as:
A 
CM
1 B ⇐⇒ CM(A) ≤ CM(B)
The CardMin criterion compares game forms in terms of the smallest set of outcomes
that individual 1 can be facing when choosing his strategy. In terms of control over
outcomes, it seems reasonable to state that the vector (x,y) oﬀers exactly the same
amount of control as the vector (x,y,x,y,x). Indeed, the state of the world in both
cases will lie, once the game has been played, in exactly the same set of alternatives,
{x,y}. Moreover, it can be stated that the set {x,y} oﬀers more control than the set
{w,z,a,b,c}. This is because the state of the world, once the game is played, will lie
within a smaller set of alternatives. Individual 1 has less uncertainty about his future
in the ﬁrst case or said diﬀerently, the ﬁnal outcome is more predictable in the ﬁrst
than in the second case.
If it is a pure notion of control we are interested in, abstracting from any other consider-
ation such as preferences, then it seems reasonnable that individual 1 will choose in his
set of strategies the one oﬀering the less possible diﬀerent outcomes. In the game Aex,
player 1, willing to reduce as much as possible the uncertainty about the outcome, or
willing to get the most control he can over those outcomes, will choose strategy u. This
is what suggests the CardMin criterion. Again, this criterion would be more diﬃcult
to accept if preferences were considered.




s0 l m n
t0 m m m
u0 p q r
In Aex, the CardMin strategy is u and it yields D(u,Aex) = {x,y} while in the second
the CardMin strategy is t0, yielding D(t0,A0
ex) = {m}. According to the CardMin cri-
terion, A0
ex CM
1 Aex as in the second case individual 1 can be entirely sure about what
will be the outcome, unlike in the ﬁrst case.
Remark 2 If the outcome function g is such that g(a1,a2) 6= g(b1,b2) for all a1,b1 ∈
A1,b1,b2 ∈ A2, there are no neutral strategies whatever the sets A1 and A2. The
CardMin criterion CM
1 is then equivalent to the criterion ranking game forms according
to the size of the set A2: A1 × A2 CM
1 B1 × B2 ⇐⇒ #B2 > #A2.
Let us now turn to the characterization result.
Theorem 1 A transitive binary relation 1 satisﬁes Axioms 1 to 5 if and only if
1 =CM
1
Proof of Theorem 1:
The CardMin criterion CM
1 is transitive and satisﬁes axioms 1 to 5.
8In order to prove the other implication, the following deﬁnition will be necessary.
For any option a1 ∈ A1, let ¯ A2(a1) and N2(a1) be deﬁned as subsets of A2 such that:
(i) A2 = ¯ A2(a1) ∪ N2(a1) and ¯ A2(a1) ∩ N2(a1) = ∅
(ii) ∀a2 ∈ N2(a1),∃s0
2 ∈ ¯ A2(a1) such that a2 is ({a1} × {s0
2})-neutral
(iii) ∀a2 ∈ ¯ A2(a1),s0
2 ∈ ¯ A2(a1), g(a1,a2) 6= g(a1,s0
2).
In words, ¯ A2(a1) and N2(a1) are a partition of A2 where ¯ A2(a1) is a set such that
there is no pair of strategies that are neutral one with the other with respect to a1 and
N2(a1) is a set such that every strategy is neutral for at least one strategy in ¯ A2(a1)
with respect to a1. Of course, N2(a1) can be the empty set, and the sets ¯ A2(s) and
N2(s) are not deﬁned uniquely. However, throughout the proof when these sets are
needed it is implicitely assumed that one particular set ¯ A2(a1) has been chosen and
that it is the same that is used along. Notice ﬁnally that eventhough the set ¯ A2(a1)
can sometimes be constructed in several ways, all possible sets ¯ A2(a1) have the same
cardinality.
Consider two game forms A = A1 × A2 and B = B1 × B2 and assume a∗ is one
CardMin strategy for individual 1 in the ﬁrst game form while b∗ is one CardMin
strategy in the second game form. First the following implications are shown :
#D(a∗,A) = #D(b∗,B) =⇒ {a∗} × ¯ A2(a∗) ∼1 {b∗} × ¯ B2(b∗)
#D(a∗,A) > #D(b∗,B) =⇒ {a∗} × ¯ A2(a∗) ≺1 {b∗} × ¯ B2(b∗)
Next it is shown that any game form {a1}×A2 such that individual 1’s set of strategies
is a singleton, is indiﬀerent for individual 1 to the game form {a1} × ¯ A2(a1). Finally,
the third step proves that any game form A1 × A2 is indiﬀerent for individual 1 to the
game form {a∗} × A2 where a∗ is one Cardmin strategy for individual 1. Putting the
three steps together in the last part will complete the proof.
The proof of step 1 is very much inspired by the proof found in Pattanaik and Xu
(1990) for the Cardinal criterion, although it requires carefull attention for its adapta-
tion. Consider the game forms A1 × A2 and B1 × B2. Consider then the game form
{a1}× ¯ A2(a1) where a1 is any strategy in A1. In that game form there is only one single
row of outcomes, those associated to strategy a1, all of them being pairwise diﬀerent.
In the same way, consider the game form {b1} × ¯ B2(b1) where b1 is any strategy in B1.
We thus have
Z({a1} × ¯ A2(a1)) = D(a1,{a1} × ¯ A2(a1))
Z({b1} × ¯ B2(b1)) = D(b1,{b1} × ¯ B2(b1))
and
#D(a1,{a1} × ¯ A2(a1)) = # ¯ A2(a1)
#D(b1,{b1} × ¯ B2(b1)) = # ¯ B2(b1)
9The argument proceeds by induction on the cardinality of the sets ¯ A2(a1) and ¯ B2(b1).
Assume # ¯ A2(a1) = # ¯ B2(b1) = 1. According to axiom 1, {a1} × ¯ A2(a1) ∼1 {b1} ×
¯ B2(b1). Now assume that for any game forms {a1} × ¯ A0
2(a1) and {b1} × ¯ B0
2(b1) such
that # ¯ A0
2(a1) = # ¯ B0
2(b1) = n − 1 we have {a1} × ¯ A0
2(a1) ∼1 {b1} × ¯ B0
2(b1) and
assume that ¯ A2(a1) = {s1,...,sn} and ¯ B2(b1) = {t1,...,tn}. Then in particular,
{a1} × {s1,...,sn−1} ∼1 {b1} × {t1,...,tn−1}. By construction, sn is not ({a1} ×
{s1,...,sn−1})-neutral and tn is not ({b1} × {t1,...,tn−1})-neutral, so axiom 4 can be
applied. It yields {a1} × ¯ A2(a1) ∼1 {b1} × ¯ B2(b1).
It has thus been shown that #D(a1,A) = #D(b1,B) =⇒ {a1} × ¯ A2(a1) ∼1 {b1} ×
¯ B2(b1) and this is true ∀a1,b1 so this is true in particular for a∗ and b∗.
Assume now that # ¯ A2(a1) = n > m = # ¯ B2(b1) and n = m + k. Let us write
¯ A2(a1) = {s1,...,sm,sm+1,...,sn} and denote ¯ S2 = {s1,...,sm}.
According to axiom 2, sm+1 being not ({a1}×{s1})-neutral, {a1}×{s1} 1 {a1}×
{s1,sm+1}. Hence applying axiom 4 yields to {a1} × {s1,s2} 1 {a1} × {s1,s2,sm+1}.
Applying again axiom 4 a few times, one reaches {a1} × ¯ S2 1 {a1} × ( ¯ S2 ∪ {sm+1}).
One more step gives us {a1}×( ¯ S2∪{sm+2}) 1 {a1}×( ¯ S2∪{sm+1,sm+2}). But again,
{a1} × ( ¯ S2 ∪ {sm+1}) ∼1 {a1} × ( ¯ S2 ∪ {sm+2}) because the cardinality of both sets is
the same, so transitivity gives {a1} × ¯ S2 1 {a1} × ( ¯ S2 ∪ {sm+1,sm+2}).
Carrying on the same way, the addition of sm+3,...,sn respectively yields {a1} ×
¯ S2 1 {a1} × ¯ A2(a1). But by what was shown previously, {a1} × ¯ S2 ∼1 {b1} × ¯ B2(b1)
as both sets ¯ S2 and ¯ B2(b1) have the same cardinality. Finally by transitivity {b1} ×
¯ B2(b1) 1 {a1} × ¯ A2(a1).
It has thus been shown that #D(a1,A) < #D(b1,B) =⇒ {a1} × ¯ A2(a1) 1 {b1} ×
¯ B2(b1) and this is true ∀a1,b1 so this is true in particular for a∗ and b∗. The ﬁrst step
is now completed.
Now, consider any game form {a1}×A2 and the associated game form {a1}× ¯ A2(a1). Let
A2 \ ¯ A2(a1) = N2(a1) = {c1,...,ck}.4 According to axiom 3, c1 beeing ({a1}× ¯ A2(a1))-
neutral, we have {a1} × ¯ A2(a1) ∼1 {a1} × ( ¯ A2(a1) ∪ {c1}). Using the same procedure,
adding on one by one every strategy in A2 \ ¯ A2(a1), one will reach {a1} × ¯ A2(a1) ∼1
{a1}×A2. This is true for all a1 so in particular, {a∗}× ¯ A2(a∗) ∼1 {a∗}×A2, and this
concludes the second step.
For the third step, consider again a∗ as one CardMin strategy for individual 1. By
deﬁnition, #D(a∗,A) ≤ #D(ai,A) ∀D(ai,A) ∈ Z(A). According to the ﬁrst part of
the proof, this yields {a∗}× ¯ A2(a∗) 1 {ai}× ¯ A2(ai). But as just seen {a∗}× ¯ A2(a∗) ∼1
{a∗}×A2 and {ai}× ¯ A2(ai) ∼1 {ai}×A2 so transitivity gives {a∗}×A2 1 {ai}×A2.
By axiom 5, this implies that {a∗} × A2 ∼1 {a∗,ai} × A2.
4Of course it could the case that N2(a1) is empty. In that case the second step of the proof is
immediate.
10Again, a∗ is the CardMin strategy so {a∗} × A2 1 {aj} × A2 is true for any other
aj ∈ A1. By transitivity, {a∗,ai} × A2 1 {aj} × A2 so using again axiom 5, we get
{a∗,ai} × A2 ∼1 {a∗,ai,aj} × A2 and by transitivity, {a∗} × A2 ∼1 {a∗,ai,aj} × A2.
Going on the same way, one can ﬁnally reach {a∗} × A2 ∼1 A1 × A2.
Hence, putting the three steps in the reverse order, if a∗ is one CardMin strategy,
then A1 × A2 ∼1 {a∗} × A2. Furthermore, {a∗} × A2 ∼1 {a∗} × ¯ A2(a∗). This im-
plies that comparing two game forms A1 × A2 and B1 × B2 is equivalent to comparing
{a∗} × ¯ A2(a∗) and {b∗} × ¯ B2(b∗). But these two game forms can be compared on the
basis of the cardinality of the sets D(a∗,A) and D(b∗,B). 
This criterion gives a discriminating power to one particular set of strategies in the
game form, that is the set of all CardMin strategies. One weakness is thus the fact that
here any contribution to the overall control of the other strategies available is ignored.







The CardMin criterion ranks A0
ex and A00
ex as indiﬀerent though obviously the second
game form should be ranked best, given that individual 1 has total control over outcome
m in A0
ex while he has total control over l and m in A00
ex which is of course better. A00
ex
oﬀers a full amount of control over a larger set of outcomes than A0
ex does. One way of
avoiding this would be to consider a lexicographic extension of the CardMin criterion.
In case of a tie with CM
1 , the lexicographic extension would then compare game forms
by looking at the second smaller set of outcomes and so on. This is left for further
research.
Next the independence of the axioms used in the characterisation in Theorem 1 is
proved.
Proposition 1 Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are independent
Proof : In order to show that the axioms are independent, let us deﬁne some criteria
such that in turn each axiom is violated although all the others are satisﬁed.
- Let CMα be deﬁned exactly as CM, except for the comparison of singletons. Single-
tons such as considered in axiom 1 will then be compared on the basis of any predeﬁned
ranking (alphabetical order, any exogenous ranking...), allowing for strict comparisons.
Then CMα satisﬁes axioms 2 to 5, but can eventually violate axiom 1.
- Let CMax be deﬁned as the reverse of CM, that is A CMax B ⇐⇒ CM(A) ≥
CM(B). Then axioms 1, 3, 4 and 5 are satisﬁed, however, axiom 2 is violated.
- Let Card2 be deﬁned as A1 × A2 Card2 B1 × B2 ⇐⇒ #A2 ≤ #B2. Card2 violates
axiom 3 but satisﬁes all others.
- Let Par be deﬁned as follows: if the parity of #A2 is the same as the parity of
#B2 (i.e. if they are both odd or both even), then A1 × A2 Par B1 × B2 ⇐⇒
11A1 × A2 CM B1 × B2. If #A2 is odd and #B2 is even, then A1 × A2 Par B1 × B2.
Par satisﬁes all axioms except for axiom 4.
- Let Cardlex be deﬁned as follows: A1 × A2 Cardlex B1 × B2 ⇐⇒ #A1 > #B1 or
(#A1 = #B1 and CM(A1 × A2) < CM(B1 × B2)); A1 × A2 ∼Cardlex B1 × B2 ⇐⇒
#A1 = #B1 and CM(A1×A2) = CM(B1×B2). Cardlex violates axiom 5 but satisﬁes
all others. 
The generalisation to the case of n individuals should be the next step but issues
appear that are far from trivial. Although it does not seem at ﬁrst to be critical, the
generalisation turns out to be complex essentially because of the deﬁnition of the crite-
ria itself. As seen earlier, in order to implement CM
1 , one has ﬁrst to compute CM(A)
by determining the set ¯ A2(ai) for every ai ∈ A1
5. In the case of two individuals, there
is no diﬃculty in “ﬁltering” the set A2 as to obtain ¯ A2 by taking out all options leading
to replicated outcomes. In the case of n individuals, no such operation is possible. To
see this, consider the following simple example with three individuals.
A1 = {a1},A2 = {b1,b2},A3 = {c1,c2} and let the outcome function g be such
that g(a1,b1,c1) = x, g(a1,b1,c2) = y, g(a1,b2,c1) = z, g(a1,b2,c2) = x. Hence,
g(a1,b1,c1) = g(a1,b2,c2), so in order to compute CM(A) one option in individual
2 or 3’s set must be taken out in order to end up with only one strategy leading to
outcome x. However, when reducing A2 to {b1} by erasing option b2, the outcome z
is artiﬁcially thrown away at the same time as outcome x, which would be a mistake.
Erasing b1 instead of b2 takes away outcome y together with outcome x, so no option
can be withdrawn form the set A2. In the same way, there is no option one can take
away from A3 in order to suppress the outcome x without suppressing at the same time
another outcome mistakefully. Hence, there is no way of “ﬁltering out” the outcomes
when there are more than two individuals.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to introduce the notion of control over outcomes in a
social context into the literature about freedom of choice. Albeit a characterisation
result has been reached, the CardMin criterion carries some weaknesses. There are
at least two interesting lines of research that should be explored in order to push the
analysis a bit further. First, by using the same framework, some more subtle criteria,
allowing for every strategy to contribute to the overall control, would deserve attention
for characterization. A criterion that ranks game forms according to the mean value
of the cardinality of the set of outcomes associated to every strategy of individual
1 could be an example of such a criterion. Second, it seems important in order to
connect the notion of control with that of freedom of choice, to explore the reasons why
individuals might desire to have control over outcomes, thereby bringing preferences
5see deﬁnitions (i) to (iii) in the proof on Theorem 1
12into the framework. This second line of research should focus on the questions raised
by the conﬂicting concepts of freedom of choice as quality, quantity and/or diversity of
choices (see Bervoets and Gravel (2007) on the issue of diversity) as well as with the
complexity that interactions bring into the ﬁeld.
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